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 Consumer Willingness to Pay for
 Genetically Modified Food Labels
 in a Market with Diverse Information:
 Evidence from Experimental Auctions
 Wallace E. Huffman, Jason F. Shogren,
 Matthew Rousu, and Abebayehu Tegene
 With the continuing controversy over genetically modified (GM) foods, some groups
 advocate mandatory labeling of these products, while other groups oppose labeling.
 An important issue is how GM labels affect consumers' willingness to pay for these
 food products in the market. Using a statistically based economics experiment with
 adult consumers as subjects, we examine how willingness to pay changes for three
 food products - vegetable oil, tortilla chips, and potatoes - when GM labels are intro-
 duced. Participants in the experiments discounted GM-labeled foods by approximately
 14% relative to their standard-labeled counterparts. The evidence also showed that
 sequencing of food labels affects willingness to pay, and that randomizing treatments
 is an important methodological feature in experiments of willingness to pay.
 Key words: consumer demand, corn chips, experimental economics, food labels, genetic
 modification, GM foods, laboratory auctions, potatoes, vegetable oil, willingness to pay
 Introduction
 The growing controversy over genetically modified (GM) food products and consumers'
 attempts to make better food purchasing decisions have stimulated interest in new
 objective information, including food labeling. Labeling has become an important public
 policy issue worldwide. In the United States, truthful labeling has been used to provide
 consumers with information on calories, nutrients, and food ingredients. But the federal
 government requires explicit labeling only if a GM food has distinctive characteristics
 relative to the non-GM version. In contrast, the European Commission adopted geneti-
 cally modified food labels in 1997. The Commission requires each member country to
 enact a law requiring labeling of all new products containing GM organisms. Japan,
 Australia, and many other countries have also passed laws requiring GM labels for
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 major foods. Labeling involves real costs - fixed costs of testing, segregation or identity
 preservation, and risk premium for being out of contract - and variable costs of monitor-
 ing for truthfulness. A key question is: Does consumer behavior change with the presence
 of different labels?
 Mendenhall and Evenson report on a telemarketing survey conducted in February
 1999 of 55 adults in New Haven, Connecticut. Eight-two percent of these respondents
 strongly believe foods made with GM ingredients should be labeled. This finding is
 consistent with most surveys on GM foods, but it is strikingly different from the results
 of the referendum vote in Oregon on November 2002, in which approximately 70% of
 voters rejected a ballot referendum that would have mandated labels for GM foods.
 This study uses the tools of survey design, statistical experimental design, experimental
 economics theory, and the random nth-price auction to elicit consumers' willingness to
 pay (WTP) for both GM-labeled and standard-labeled foods using a random sample of
 adult consumers drawn from two Midwestern cities.1 By gathering information on three
 goods - vegetable oil, tortilla chips, and potatoes - dislike for genetic modification can
 be distinguished from dislike for a particular food item. In an experimental auction with
 divergent information about risks and benefits, we examine whether consumers value
 information provided in GM labels.
 In this study, tests of the following hypotheses are reported: (HI) GM food labels have
 no effect on WTP for food items; (H2) attributes of participants, including prior beliefs,
 do not affect WTP for food items; and (H3) no difference in willingness to pay occurs be-
 cause of the sequencing of labels in laboratory trials (i.e., whether the consumer first bids
 on foods with or without GM food labels).
 Background on GM Food and GM Labels
 Few experimental auctions have been conducted to elicit information about genetic modi-
 fication. Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux (2001) used experimental auctions with a sample
 of 97 Europeans, and found that bids for biscuits decreased by 37% when participants
 were told a product was GM. In a subsequent experimental auction paper, Noussair,
 Robin, and Ruffieux (2002) found that French consumers ignored the information on GM
 labels when labels were placed on the back of a package. These consumers initially
 price-discounted GM chocolate bars by less than 2% relative to non-GM chocolate bars.
 When the monitors emphasized the presence of the GM food label on the back of a choc-
 olate bar, the consumers discounted the GM chocolate by more than 25%. This latter
 study, however, focused solely on French consumers.
 To our knowledge, only one other study has used experimental auctions to elicit U.S.
 consumer preferences for GM or non-GM foods. Lusk et al. conducted experimental auc-
 tions with 50 undergraduate agricultural business students at Kansas State University.
 All subjects were endowed with a bag of GM corn chips. Using first- and second-price
 auctions, Lusk et al. observed that a majority of the student participants would not pay
 to upgrade to a bag of non-GM corn chips. One potential problem in their experimental
 design was the inability to distinguish dislike for corn chips from dislike for GM chips.
 Because we use multiple products, employ a larger participant base, and work with
 1 Currently, many unlabeled GM food products are available in U.S. grocery stores, and labeling is voluntary. If GM labels
 were present, testing consumers' willingness to pay for foods with GM food labels and foods with standard food labels would
 be an appropriate measure.
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 adult, U.S. consumers, the present study can produce inferences extending beyond these
 earlier studies.
 Caswell (1998, 2000) and Caswell and Padberg have shown that many policies are
 possible, including mandatory labeling of GM foods, voluntary labeling of GM foods, or
 bans on all labeling identifying whether a food is GM. The policies each country chooses
 are likely to be determined by the information demanded by domestic consumers. An
 informed decision on whether to implement a labeling policy on GM foods should only
 be made after a benefit-cost analysis is conducted. Then politicians can weight the net
 economic benefit against other purely political factors when deciding whether to require
 GM labeling.
 Two prominent environmental groups, Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, believe
 GM labeling would benefit consumers, and these groups advocate labels on GM foods
 to give consumers the right to choose whether to consume GM products. Many environ-
 mental and consumer advocacy groups have demanded mandatory labeling, which they
 argue will benefit consumers. While there may be benefits, implementing a labeling
 policy would be costly. The USDA's Economic Research Service considered the range of
 costs associated with implementing a labeling policy (Golan et al.). If a mandatory
 labeling policy on GM foods is enacted, significant costs would be incurred. Potential
 fixed costs include testing, identity preservation, accidental contamination of non-GM
 crops by their GM counterparts, and reformulation costs. All items imply real supply-
 side costs when a labeling policy is implemented.
 Relatively few estimates of the cost of labeling GM foods exist in the literature. A
 study by Wilson and Dahl, however, estimates wheat identity preservation would cost
 $1.45 ($3.36) per bushel for a 5% (1%) tolerance level (although labeling costs could be
 lower than identity preservation costs). Moreover, in estimates published in the
 AgBiotech Reporter (August 2001), the Philippine Chamber of Food Manufacturers
 warned that mandatory GM food labels would increase production costs by 15%, and
 these increased costs would be passed on to consumers. These added labeling, handling,
 and storage costs would lead to higher prices for consumers and possibly lower prices
 to producers. One conclusion seems apparent: Implementing a labeling policy on GM
 foods is costly and involves uncertain effects on firms, consumers, and the industry.
 Experimental Design
 The research project was designed to incorporate the private information-revealing
 feature of experimental auction markets, the rigorous randomized treatments of statis-
 tical experimental design (see, for example, Hoffman et al.; Fox et al.; and Shogren, List,
 and Hayes), and random sampling methods from survey design.2 The primary purpose
 of the project was to identify the effects of GM food labels and different perspectives on
 genetic modification on consumers' WTP for food items that might be GM. In this analy-
 sis, we concentrate on the set of experimental auctions in which food items differed only
 by the presence or absence of GM food labels.3
 2 Professors Phil Dixon and Wayne Fuller, Department of Statistics, Iowa State University, provided assistance with the
 statistical design of the project.
 The conclusions from the statistical analysis of this paper are not changed significantly by including information treat-
 ment effects which were randomly assigned. In a major companion paper, we examine the analytics and measure the value
 of third-party or verifiable information (see Rousu et al.).
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 There are two factors in this experiment: first, the sequence in which consumers bid
 on the food products with GM labels, and second, the type of information consumers
 could receive. For the first factor, consumers could bid on food products with GM labels
 before they bid on plain-labeled food products, or they could bid on food products with
 GM labels after they bid on plain-labeled food products. For the second factor, associated
 with the perspective on genetic modification, consumers could receive a combination of
 the biotech industry perspective, the environmental group perspective, and the third-
 party perspective, or verifiable biotech information (see Huffman and Tegene).
 There are two levels for the labeling-order factor and six levels for the information
 factor (biotech industry perspective, environmental group perspective, biotech industry
 and environmental group perspectives, biotech industry and third-party perspectives,
 environmental group and third-party perspectives, and all three perspectives). The
 experimental design has two levels by six levels, yielding a total of 12 treatments. Each
 of the 12 treatments is randomly assigned to one of 12 experimental units, comprised
 of 13 to 16 consumers. This design was anticipated to achieve a desired sample size of
 165 to 190 participants, a size considered necessary for finding statistically significant
 results without being prohibitively costly.
 Using statistical sampling methods, a random digital dialing procedure was employed
 to select consumers who were adults living in two major Midwestern metropolitan areas,
 Des Moines, Iowa, and St. Paul, Minnesota. These cities were chosen because they
 represent two large metropolitan areas of the Midwest (in contrast to small university
 cities like Ames), and yet were easily accessible by researchers centered in Ames, Iowa.
 Conducting experiments in two urban areas rather than one is also seen as enhancing
 credibility by demonstrating that the experiments can be replicated across urban
 areas. Nevertheless, caution must be exercised in generalizing to the broader popu-
 lation of the Midwest or to the entire U.S. population (also see relevant comments in
 Lusk et al.).
 We now describe the four elements in this study's GM labeling experiments - the GM
 food, the auction mechanism, the experimental units, and the specific steps in the exper-
 iment (which includes the detailed information labels).
 The GM Food
 We anticipated that consumers might react differently to GM content for foods of differ-
 ent types. Because one food item was unlikely to reveal enough information, three items
 were used: vegetable oil made from soybeans, tortilla chips made from yellow corn, and
 russet potatoes. In the distilling and refining process for vegetable oils, essentially all
 of the proteins (which are the components of DNA and the source of genetic modifi-
 cation) are removed, leaving pure lipids. Minimal human health concerns should arise
 from consumption of the oil, but people might still fear that GM soybeans could harm
 the natural environment. Tortilla chips are highly processed foods which may be made
 from GM or non-GM corn, and consumers might have human health or environmental
 concerns or both. Russet potatoes are purchased as a fresh product and generally fried
 or baked before eating. Consumers might reasonably see the potential concentration of
 genetic modification as being different in potatoes than in processed corn chips. Conse-
 quently, consumers might have concerns about both human health and environmental
 risks from eating russet potatoes.
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 The Random nth-Price Auction
 Over the past decade, scientists conducting valuation experiments have used auction
 mechanisms to induce individuals to reveal their preferences for new goods and services
 (e.g., see Shogren et al. 1994; Fox et al.; Shogren, List, and Hayes). Vickrey^ sealed bid,
 second-price auction has been a popular mechanism. The popularity of the second-price
 auction mechanism is largely because it is demand revealing in theory, is relatively
 simple to explain, and has an endogenous market-clearing price. Also, evidence from
 induced-value experiments suggests the auction mechanism can produce efficient out-
 comes in the aggregate (Kagel).
 Although a second-price auction is better than a first-price auction, a problem arises
 in second-price auctions in that they tend not to engage bidders who anticipate being
 off the margin (i.e., bidders whose value for a good is far below or above the market-
 clearing price). These bidders have a low opportunity cost from an insincere bid, making
 it difficult to measure accurately the entire demand curve for a new good like GM food
 (see Miller and Plott; Franciosi et al.). Insincere bidding can be sustained if the behavior
 is undetected and unpunished by the institutional structure of the auction mechanism
 (see Cherry, Crocker, and Shogren).
 We chose the random nth-price auction for our GM food experiments over the second-
 price auction because it engages both the on- and off-the-margin bidders and helps
 ensure that consumers reveal their demand truthfully (see Shogren et al. 2001). The
 auction combines elements of two classic demand-revealing mechanisms: the Vickrey
 auction and the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak random-pricing mechanism. The key char-
 acteristic of the random nth-price auction is a random but endogenously determined
 market-clearing price. Randomness is used to give all participants a positive probability
 of being a purchaser of the auctioned good; the endogenous price guarantees the market-
 clearing price is related to the bidders' private values.
 The random nth-price auction works as follows. Each of k bidders submits a bid for one
 unit of a good; then each of the bids is rank ordered from highest to lowest. The auction
 monitor then selects a random number (the n in the nth-price auction) which is drawn
 from a uniform distribution between 2 and k, and the auction monitor sells one unit of the
 good to each of the n -1 highest bidders at the nth price. For instance, if the monitor ran-
 domly selects n = 4, the three highest bidders each purchase one unit of the good priced
 at the fourth-highest bid. Ex ante, bidders who have low or moderate valuations now have
 a nontrivial chance to buy the good because the price is determined randomly. This
 auction increases the probability that insincere bidding will be costly (Shogren et al. 2001).
 The Experimental Units
 Auctions were planned and conducted at two Midwestern U.S. cities - Des Moines, Iowa,
 and St. Paul, Minnesota. An independent institution (the Iowa State University
 Statistics Laboratory) called telephone numbers chosen by a random digital dialing
 method, and each adult was asked if he or she was willing to participate in a group
 session in Des Moines (St. Paul) relating "to how people select food and household
 products."4 They were informed the session would last about 90 minutes, and were also
 4 Because common grocery store products were auctioned, participants were not required to be the main grocery shopper
 in the household.
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 told that at the end of the session each participant would receive $40 in cash for his or
 her time.
 Three different times were available each auction day - 9 am, 11:30 am, and 2 pm.
 Willing participants were asked to choose a time most convenient to their schedule. The
 12 experimental units were split equally between Des Moines and St. Paul and were
 held on April 7 and April 21, 2001. After adjusting for unusable phone numbers, the ISU
 Statistics Laboratory contacted approximately 950 people; 200 individuals accepted the
 invitation to participate, although 20 people failed to show, leaving 180 people who came
 to the lab to participate. The response rate, after adjusting for unusable telephone num-
 bers, was 19%. In addition, eight individuals had to be turned away because the quota
 for their time slot was full by the time they arrived (a maximum of 16 people per group
 was set), leaving 172 total participants.5
 Steps in the Experiment
 The 10 specific steps in each experimental unit are detailed below.6
 ■ In Step 1, when participants arrived at the experiment, they signed a consent form
 agreeing to participate in the auction. After signing this form, each individual was given
 $40 for participating and an ID number to preserve the participant's anonymity. The
 participants then read brief instructions and filled out a pre-auction questionnaire. The
 questionnaire was designed to collect demographic information and to determine con-
 sumers' perceptions of the safety of vaccinations for diseases, eating meat from animals
 fed growth hormones, and of irradiated and GM foods.7
 ■ In Step 2, participants were given detailed instructions about how the random nth-
 price auction works, including an example written on the blackboard. After the partici-
 pants learned about the auction, they were given a short quiz to ensure everyone under-
 stood how the auction worked.
 ■ Step 3 was the first practice round of bidding, in which participants bid on a brand-
 name candy bar. The participants were all asked to examine the product and then place
 a bid on the candy bar. The bids were collected and the first round of practice bidding
 was over. Throughout the auctions, when the participants were bidding on items in a
 round, they had no indication of what other items they might be bidding on in future
 rounds.
 5 We went to considerable expense to obtain participants who were selected by a random digital dialing process. Potential
 participants were told they were being invited to participate in an Iowa State University project dealing with household and
 food products, but they were not told the purpose of the project was to test consumers' willingness to pay for genetically
 modified foods. This information was purposely withheld to ensure the participation decision was unrelated to an individual's
 attitudes toward agricultural biotechnology. Of course, some individuals chose not to participate. It is unknown whether these
 unwilling subjects are statistically different from the participants. Based on the summary data reported in table 1, however,
 the demographic characteristics of our sample match closely those reported by the 2000 U.S. Census for the two areas where
 participants were chosen. Caution is warranted in making generalizations beyond the Midwest.
 6 The complete set of instructions given to participants is available from the authors upon request.
 7 It seems unlikely that the pre-auction questions about perceived GM risks significantly affected the results. The question
 dealing with GM food products was at the very beginning of each auction session and placed near questions about the
 frequency at which the population was made ill during the past year from eating irradiated meat or poultry and consuming
 meat from animals fed growth hormones. Also, after the participants went through several steps in the auction, they were
 given at least one full page of information from an interested party (either the biotech industry or the environmental group
 perspective) before bidding on food products. Any potential effect from the GM information question was likely to have been
 overwhelmed by other information presented to consumers in step 6.
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 ■ Step 4 was the second practice round of bidding, and in this round the participants
 placed separate bids on three different items. The products were the same brand-name
 candy bar, a deck of playing cards, and a box of pens. Participants knew that only one
 of the two rounds would be chosen at random to be binding, which prevented anyone
 from taking home more than one unit of any product. Following Melton et al., this random
 binding round eliminates the threat of a person reducing his or her bids because the
 individual potentially buys more than one unit.8 The consumers first examined the three
 products and then submitted their bids.
 ■ After the two practice auction rounds were completed, the binding round and the
 binding nth prices were revealed in Step 5. All bid prices were written on the black-
 board, and the Aith price was circled for each of the three products. Participants could
 see immediately what items they won, and the price they would pay. The participants
 were told that the exchange of money for goods was in another room nearby and would
 take place after the entire experiment was completed.
 ■ In Step 6, participants received information about biotechnology. Three info-packets
 were produced as follows: (a) the environmental group perspective - a collection of state-
 ments and information on genetic modification from Greenpeace, a leading environ-
 mental group; (6) the industry perspective - a collection of statements and information
 on genetic modification provided by a group of leading biotechnology companies,
 including Monsanto and Syngenta; and (c) the independent, third-party perspective - a
 statement on genetic modification approved by a third-party group, consisting of a variety
 of people knowledgeable about GM goods, including scientists, professionals, religious
 leaders, and academics, who do not have a financial stake in GM foods. These informa-
 tion sheets are provided in the appendix.
 These three info-packets were used to create six information treatments: (a) only the
 biotech industry perspective, (6) only the environmental group perspective, (c) biotech
 industry and environmental perspectives, (d) biotech industry and third-party perspec-
 tives, (e) environmental group and third-party perspectives, and (/) all three perspectives.
 In the context of this study, focus is exclusively on the important issue of consumers'
 preferences for GM- versus plain-labeled food items. The impact of information on
 consumer behavior is not addressed.9
 Once the appropriate info-packet was distributed to the participants in a given unit,
 two auction rounds were then conducted. The rounds were differentiated by the food
 label - either the food had a standard food label or a GM label (see figure 1). In one
 round, which could be round 1 or round 2 depending on the experimental unit, parti-
 cipants bid on the three food products each with the standard food label. These labels
 were made as plain as possible to avoid any influence on the bids from the label design.
 In the other round, participants bid on the same three food products, but with a GM
 label, which differed from the standard label by the inclusion of only one extra sentence:
 "This product is made using genetic modification (GM)." For each experimental unit,
 8 If one assumes there is little or no income effect from the deck of cards and box of pens, the two bids on the candy bar
 should be the same - i.e., because the deck of cards and box of pens are neither complements nor substitutes to the candy bar,
 they should not affect the bids on the candy bar. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test confirmed the bids for the candy bars are not
 significantly different in the two rounds, with a test statistic of 0.03. This result does not contradict the notion that the
 subjects' bidding behavior was reasonable.
 9 To more intricately examine the issue of consumer acceptance of GM labeling, this analysis is devoted entirely to the
 consumer reaction to labeling, without examining impact of information treatments. The interested reader is referred to a
 companion paper that presents a detailed evaluation of the information effects (Rousu et al.).
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 Russet Potatoes
 Net weight 5 lbs. Russet Potatoes
 This product is made using "*' ■"**'* Ä*.
 genetic modification (GM).
 Tortilla Chips
 Net weight 16 oz. Tortilla Chips
 Fresh made Thursday 7 April * 5th .. . . . . .. 7 * Net .. . weight . . . 16 .. oz.
 This product is made using Fresh made Thursday April 5th
 genetic modification (GM).
 Vegetable Oil
 Net weight 32 fl. oz. Vegetable Oil
 This product is made using Net weight 32 f I. oz.
 genetic modification (GM).
 Figure 1. GM and standard labels used for the three food items
 participants knew that only one round would be chosen as the binding round which
 determined auction winners.10 The sequencing of the standard food and GM labels was
 randomized across experimental units. One unit had the standard label in round 1, and
 the GM label in round 2; the second unit had the GM label in round 1, and the standard
 label in round 2.
 ■ In Step 7, participants bid on three different food products: a bag of potatoes, a bottle
 of vegetable oil, and a bag of tortilla chips, either with the standard or GM label. The
 participants were instructed to examine the three products and then to write down their
 sealed bid for each of the three goods. Participants bid on each good separately. The
 monitor then collected the bids from the participants and told them they were next
 going to look at another group of food items.11
 ■ Step 8 had participants examine the same three food products, each with a different
 label, from round 1. Again the participants examined the products and bid on the three
 products separately. The bids were then collected from all of the individuals.
 ■ Step 9 selected the binding round, and the binding random nth prices for the three
 goods. Winners were notified. Each individual was asked to complete a brief post-auction
 questionnaire to see if the participant's risk attitudes changed, and to inquire about who
 he or she would trust for information on genetic modification (see Huffman et al.).
 10 By bidding on foods with GM labels in one round and standard labels in the other round, participants are bidding on
 labels with statements which are similar to those found on labels in major markets with GM labels, like those in the
 European Union and Australia (see CNN; Australia-New Zealand Food Authority 2000, 2001).
 11 Unlike some food safety experiments (e.g. , Shogren et al. 1994), we do not require immediate consumption of the products
 for people who win the auction. At least two of our three products are ones that are not usually consumed at the point of
 sale - vegetable oil and raw potatoes. Furthermore, adults regularly make family food-purchase decisions in grocery stores
 and supermarkets (e.g., see Carlson, Kinsey, and Nadav), which suggests that having an adult place bids in our experiment
 seemed entirely appropriate for most households.
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 ■ In Step 10, the monitors dismissed the participants who did not win. The monitors
 and the winners exchanged money for goods, and the winners were then dismissed.
 Although standard experimental-auction valuation procedures were followed (e.g.,
 Shogren et al. 1994), several refinements were made to our experimental design to
 better reflect consumer purchases. First, our subjects submitted only one bid per product.
 The protocol of using multiple repeated trials and posting market-clearing prices was
 not followed, to avoid any question of creating affiliated values that can affect the
 demand-revealing nature of a laboratory auction (see, for example, List and Shogren).
 Second, subjects were not endowed with any food item and then asked to "upgrade" to
 another food item; rather, participants were paid $40, and then they bid on different
 foods in only two trials. This approach avoids the risk of an in-kind endowment effect
 distorting the participant's bidding behavior (e.g., see Lusk and Schroeder, or Corrigan
 and Rousu) and the risk of any credit constraint. Third, each consumer bid on three
 unrelated food items. Thus, if he or she did not have positive demand for one or two
 products, we could still obtain information on the participant's taste for genetic modifi-
 cation based on the second and (or) third products. Fourth, treatments to the experi-
 mental units were randomly assigned; now estimation of treatment effect is simply the
 difference in means across treatments (see Wooldridge, pp. 603-607).
 Fifth, we used adult consumers over 18 years of age from two different Midwestern
 metropolitan areas, who were chosen using a random digital dialing method.12 Because
 we use common food items available to shoppers in grocery stores and supermarkets,
 we wanted adult rather than student subjects, to better reflect a typical household of
 consumers. Although several studies have used college undergraduates in laboratory
 auctions of food items (e.g., Hayes et al.; Lusk et al.), students are not the best choice for
 participants when the items being auctioned are ones sold in grocery stores or super-
 markets. Using a national random sample of grocery store shoppers, Katsaras et al.
 found that the share of college-age (18 to 24 years) shoppers falls far below their share
 in the population - 8.5% of shoppers versus 12.8% in the U.S. Census of Population.
 College students obtain a large share of their food from school cafeterias and only a
 small share from grocery stores and supermarkets compared to older shoppers (Carlson,
 Kinsey, and Nadav). Although our participants are slightly skewed toward women,
 Katsaras et al. note that women make up a disproportional share of grocery shoppers -
 83% of shoppers versus 52% in the U.S. Census of Population. A sample primarily of
 grocery store shoppers also weakens the sometimes-stated need for having students
 participate in several rounds of bidding to stabilize bids for food items. The Iowa State
 University Statistics Laboratory selected potential participants from a randomly gener-
 ated list of telephone numbers in the Des Moines and St. Paul areas by using a random
 digital dialing method. A summary of the demographic characteristics of the partici-
 pants is displayed in table 1.
 Finally, this experimental design and implementation allow for results going beyond
 those of the two earlier experimental auction studies of GM foods (Lusk et al.; and
 Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux 2002). The Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux study was
 conducted in France; our experiments were conducted in two cities in the Midwestern
 Information on other characteristics, like the age of children in the household and membership in environmental groups,
 was collected but is not reported to simplify the exposition. All non-reported information is available from the authors upon
 request.
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.217 on Fri, 18 Nov 2016 16:45:01 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 490 December 2003 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
 Table 1. Characteristics of the Auction Participants and Characteristics of the
 Populations of Polk and Ramsey Counties (which contain Des Moines, IA, and
 St. Paul, MN)
 County
 Sample Population Mean a
 Standard
 Variable Definition Mean Deviation Polk Ramsey
 Gender 1 if female 0.62 0.49 0.52 0.52
 Age Participant's age (years) 49.5 17.5 45.7 45.7
 Married* 1 if the individual is married 0.67 0.47 0.59 0.51
 Education* Years of schooling 14.54 2.25 13.52 13.76
 Household Number of people in participant's household 2.78 1.65
 Income Household's income level ($000s) 57.0 32.6 46.1 45.7
 White 1 if participant is white 0.90 0.30 0.90 0.80
 ReadJL 1 if never reads labels before a new food purchase 0.01 0.11
 1 if rarely reads labels before a new food purchase 0.11 0.31
 1 if sometimes reads labels before a new food purchase 0.31 0.46
 1 if often reads labels before a new food purchase 0.37 0.48
 1 if always reads labels before a new food purchase 0.20 0.40
 Informed 1 if individual is self-reported as at least somewhat
 informed regarding genetically modified (GM) foods 0.42 0.49
 Labelsl 1 if the treatment bid on foods with GM labels occurs
 in round 1 0.52 0.50
 Note: For the Polk and Ramsey county figures, all variables are for individuals of all ages, except for Married, which is for
 individuals 18 or older; Education, which is for individuals 25 or older; and Age, which is for individuals 20 or older.
 •Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
 bFor the Polk and Ramsey county estimates, the number of married people who are 18 or older was obtained by taking the
 number of people married over 15 and assuming that the number of people who were married at ages 15, 16, and 17 was
 zero. This gives the percentage of married people who are 18 or older.
 c For Polk and Ramsey counties, the years of schooling were estimated by placing a value of 8 for those who have not
 completed 9th grade, 10.5 for those who have not completed high school, 12 for those who have completed high school but
 have had no college, 13.5 for those with some college but no degree, 14 for those with an associate's degree, 16 for those with
 a bachelor's degree, and 18 for those with a graduate or professional degree.
 United States. Compared to the one published experimental economics study measuring
 tastes for genetic modification using U.S. consumers (Lusk et al.), our experimental
 design extends the earlier work in three areas. First, our 172 participants are adult
 consumers, unknown to us, and randomly chosen from a list of telephone numbers in
 two Midwestern cities. Our sample is more than three times larger than the 50 students
 used in Lusk et al., and consists of adults responsible for household food shopping rather
 than university students. Second, the incentive-compatible random nth-price auction
 is used, rather than splitting the sample into a second-price auction and a nondemand-
 revealing first-price auction, and, to avoid learning effects, consumers are randomly
 assigned to treatments that did not have a multiple sequence of trials. Third, in the
 Lusk et al. study, it is impossible to correctly interpret a zero bid - i.e., whether it meant
 a student disliked the food for sale or disliked genetic modification. In contrast, we asked
 consumers to bid on three different food items rather than on one product. This approach
 permits identification of a consumer's preferences for food versus his or her preferences
 for genetic modification. If a participant did not like one kind of food, reliable infor-
 mation on the other two food products can be obtained.
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 Table 2. Number and Percentage of Individuals Who Bid Less
 for the GM-Labeled Food than for the Standard-Labeled Food
 (N = 172)
 Individuals Bidding Less for
 GM-Labeled Version of the Product
 Description of Product Number Percent (%)
 Tortilla Chips, 16 oz. bag 70 41
 Vegetable Oil, 32 fl. oz. bottle 63 37
 Russet Potatoes, 5 lb. bag 60 35
 All three items 44 26
 At least one of the three items 100 58
 Experimental Results and Statistical Analysis
 Table 2 reports the number of participants who bid less for the GM-labeled food than
 for the standard-labeled food. For each good, 35% to 41% of the participants bid less for
 the GM-labeled variety. Most participants showed a general dislike for genetic modifi-
 cation - about 60% of the participants bid less for the GM-labeled version for at least one
 of the three products. About 26% of the subjects bid less for all three GM-labeled pro-
 ducts than for standard-labeled products, which indicates a strong preference against
 GM foods.
 Table 3 gives the mean bids for each of the three products: a 32-ounce bottle of
 vegetable oil, a 1-pound bag of tortilla chips, and a 5-pound bag of potatoes. Panel A of
 table 3 shows the mean bids for all participants. For each of the three food products,
 participants were willing to pay less when the product had the GM label than when it
 displayed the standard food label. Both one-tailed ¿-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests
 show that the difference is statistically significant at the 5% significance level.13
 Both table 2 and panel A of table 3 provide univariate tests of the first hypothesis:
 (HI) GM labels have no effect on consumers' WTP for food items. This hypothesis is
 rejected; GM labels are found to affect consumer WTP for food products.14 The percent-
 age discount for each product was approximately 14%, indicating consumers displayed
 a general dislike for genetic modification, but they did not seem to dislike one type of
 genetically modified product more or less than another. Consumers, for instance, did not
 appear to view genetic modification of the soybeans used to make vegetable oil better
 than genetic modification in potatoes. This result suggests respondents' concerns about
 GM technology are largely environmental and not human health.
 In most economics experiments of food products (e.g., Melton et al.; Hayes et al.; Lusk
 et al. 2001; Shogren et al. 2000), all participants have been subjected to the same
 sequence of treatments. It is impossible to disentangle treatment effects from sequencing
 13 These tests are univariate tests. Like all univariate tests, they suggest a simple relationship, indicating here that con-
 sumers paid less for food products with GM labels. However, they provide no information about why consumers paid less for
 food products with GM labels.
 14 The mean bid prices are slightly lower than a person might see in a grocery store. This is logical because a rational bidder
 should not bid more for a product than the price he or she can find in a store (although some participants could add travel
 costs to a bid price). This upper bound suggests that mean bids in most auctions should be less than the average price for a
 product one finds in a store, although this remains to be established in the lab.
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 Table 3. Mean Bids for Each of the Three Products
 PANEL A. Mean Bids, All Participants
 No. of Mean Standard No. of
 Product Description Observations Bid Deviation Maximum Zero Bids
 Vegetable oil (GM) 172 0.91 0.84 3.99 39
 Vegetable oil (standard) 172 1.05 0.85 3.79 28
 Tortilla chips (GM) 172 0.93 0.86 3.99 37
 Tortilla chips (standard) 172 1.08 0.85 4.99 17
 Russet potatoes (GM) 172 0.78 0.67 3.00 33
 Russet potatoes (standard) 172 0.91 0.67 3.89 14
 PANEL B. Mean Bids When Participants Bid on Food with GM Food Labels in Round 1
 No. of Mean Standard No. of
 Product Description Observations Bid Deviation Maximum Zero Bids
 Vegetable oil (GM) 88 0.98 0.91 3.99 23
 Vegetable oil (standard) 88 1.04 0.89 3.79 19
 Tortilla chips (GM) 88 0.95 0.87 3.25 22
 Tortilla chips (standard) 88 1.05 0.81 4.99 12
 Russet potatoes (GM) 88 0.90 0.69 2.50 15
 Russet potatoes (standard) 88 0.94
 PANEL C. Mean Bids When Participants Bid on Food with GM Food Labels in Round 2
 No. of Mean Standard No. of
 Product Description Observations Bid Deviation Maximum Zero Bids
 Vegetable oil (GM) 84 0.83 0.77 3.25 16
 Vegetable oil (standard) 84 1.06 0.80 3.00 9
 Tortilla chips (GM) 84 0.90 0.86 3.99 15
 Tortilla chips (standard) 84 1.11 0.89 4.99 5
 Russet potatoes (GM) 84 0.65 0.63 3.00 18
 Russet potatoes (standard) 84 0.88
 effects. In table 3, panel B, bids are shown for the subset of auction participants who bid
 on food products having GM food labels in round 1, and panel C shows the bids for
 participants who bid on food products having the GM labels in round 2. The bids for the
 GM-labeled and standard-labeled food are much closer when participants bid first on
 GM food (round 1) compared to those who bid on GM-labeled food second (round 2). For
 two of the three products (potatoes and vegetable oil), the difference due to the order is
 statistically significant at the 5% level (both ¿-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests show
 the same results). We therefore reject hypothesis 3: (H3) no difference exists in con-
 sumers' WTP for food items due to the GM food label treatment sequence. In our
 experiment, the order in which consumers bid on food products influences their bid. This
 is an i portant finding because many experimental economics studies use repeated,
 non-randomized trials to gain information on consumer preferences. The results of this
 analysis indicate randomization is important to ensure results are not an artifact of the
 sequence used in the experiment.
 To graphically explore the distribution of the difference in bid prices between the
 GM-labeled and plain-labeled products, histograms are presented in figure 2. For all
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 Figure 2. Histogram of the difference in bid prices ($s) for plain-labeled
 and GM-labeled versions of each of the three commodities (N = 172)
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 three products, the majority of participants have no difference in bid prices between
 GM-labeled and plain-labeled food products. However, for all three products, there are
 some participants who bid more for the plain-labeled products, with several participants
 placing premiums of $1 or more. For all three products, very few people bid less for the
 plain-labeled product than for the GM-labeled product.
 To further explore the bids for GM-labeled and plain-labeled food products of parti-
 cipants, consider the following equation:
 (1) P¡ = ß. + ßgX^ + ji*, k = plain-labeled, GM-labeled,
 where the price of the £th labeled commodity by the jth participant, P*9 is a function of
 a linear unmeasured effect (ß,) that is constant across commodity labels for a given
 individual, regressors X,2 that vary across individuals but not across labels for a given
 individual (i.e., a participant's age, education, household income, gender), and a zero
 mean random disturbance term across labels and individuals (}i*). Now taking differ-
 ences across label types gives:
 ÍO' r% plain-labeled ^labeled _ [^plain-labeled rdabeled'^ plain-labeled _ labeled
 Note that the intercept term, the unmeasured effect across labels for a given individual,
 vanishes and the vector of coefficient differences is a measure of the difference in impact
 of a factor on a plain-labeled versus a GM-labeled food item, and the differenced disturb-
 ance term across individuals and labels. The coefficients and error terms in (2) can be
 condensed and rewritten as:
 (3) pplain-labeled _ ^labeled = ß ♦ + ß ♦ ^ + ^
 The coefficient of ß^ is expected to be small and not significantly different from zero; the
 vector of parameters ß^ is expected to be significantly different from zero only if a
 regressor has a different marginal impact on the price of plain-labeled than on GM-
 labeled food items. Otherwise these coefficients should be approximately zero. The
 disturbance term p* is expected to have a zero mean after the censoring in equation (1).
 All participants placed a bid on GM-labeled and plain-labeled potatoes, tortilla
 chips, and vegetable oil. Equation (3) is then estimated using a fixed-effects model
 in which each product is a fixed effect. All bids are pooled over the three products,
 yielding 172 x 3 = 516 observations. Although the minimum bid for any product is zero,
 some participants may have viewed a product as a "bad" and preferred a negative
 valuation.
 In equation (1), for {k = plain-labeled, GM-labeled}, the price could be censored at zero,
 so we take account of this censoring in fitting equation (3). The censored regression
 model examines the two components of the dependent variable, the bid for the plain-
 labeled product and the bid for the GM-labeled product. The dependent variable is con-
 sidered censored if either (a) the bid for the GM-labeled product is zero, (ö) the bid for
 the plain-labeled product is zero, or (c) the bids for the plain-labeled product and the
 GM-labeled product are both zero. Note that in our model, the dependent variable itself
 can be zero and still not be censored (e.g., if a participant bids $2 for both the GM-labeled
 and plain-labeled version of a product). Our findings show this result arises quite
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 frequently. This model is estimated using a maximum-likelihood procedure in the
 LIFEREG PROCEDURE in SAS, version 8 (the data and code used are available from
 the authors upon request).
 The censoring has four cases:15
 ■ Case 1. Consumer j bids a positive amount for both the GM-labeled and the plain-
 labeled product. The measured difference in bid prices is the difference between the
 two bid prices (non-censored case).
 ■ Case 2. Consumer j bids zero for the GM-labeled product and a positive amount for
 the plain-labeled product. The "true" difference in bid prices with the censored
 regression will be greater than the difference between the two observed bid prices.
 This outcome arises because the bids on the GM-labeled product are censored at zero.
 ■ Case 3. Consumer.; bids a positive amount for the GM-labeled product and zero for
 the plain-labeled product. This is similar to case 2 in which the true difference in
 bid prices for the censored regression is absolutely larger than the measured
 difference between the two bid prices.
 ■ Case 4. Consumer j bids zero for both products. This case does not give any infor-
 mation about the consumer's true demand for GM products.16
 Because our model treats zero bids for both the GM-labeled and plain-labeled food pro-
 ducts as censored bids, all four cases are correctly accounted for.
 Censored regression results from fitting equation (3) with commodity fixed effects to
 explain the difference in bid price (plain-labeled minus GM-labeled) for the sample are
 reported in table 4. In regressions (1) and (2), the estimate of the intercept is small, as
 expected, and it is not significantly different from zero at the 5% level in regression (2).
 The coefficients of the sociodemographic variables in regression (2) are not significantly
 different from zero, i.e., a participant's gender, education, age, or prior beliefs about GM
 technology individually do not have a significant effect on bid price differences.
 Also, we performed a joint test that all four of the coefficients for the sociodemo-
 graphic variables are zero. Using the information in regressions (1) and (2), the sample
 value of the chi-squared statistic for this test is 3.04, and the critical value is 9.5 with
 four degrees of freedom at the 5% significance level. Hypothesis H2 cannot be rejected:
 Sociodemographic attributes of participants, including prior beliefs about genetic
 modification, individually and jointly do not have a significant effect on bid price differ-
 ences.17 However, hypothesis H3 is rejected: The estimated coefficient for the dummy
 variable denoting a respondent was presented with GM labels in round 1 of bidding is
 significantly different from zero. Randomizing the labeling treatment is an important
 15 The dependent variable in equation (2) has two parts, each of which could be censored. This is not a typical Tobit model,
 but rather a more general censored regression model. For a good review of censored regression models, see Wooldridge (2002,
 pp. 517-550).
 16 A participant might bid zero for each version of a product for several reasons. For example, the participant may dislike
 a particular food product. Or the participant may be placing a "protest bid" because he or she does not like the procedures.
 (See Shogren, List, and Hayes for a more detailed explanation on why consumers bid as they do in experimental auctions.)
 1 The method used is a linear labeling-variant fixed effect, censored regression model to carry out the tests of H2. The fixed
 effect being removed is any common unmeasured linear, labeling-invariant fixed effect that is product specific (see Wool-
 dridge, pp. 247-249), and it is not a Tobit model. The differencing method safeguards against potential coefficient bias which
 would be caused by an unmeasured individual effect being correlated with demographic attributes.
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 Table 4. Censored Regression, Fixed-Effects Model Explaining Difference in
 Bid Price for Plain-Labeled and GM-Labeled Foods (N = 516)
 (Dependent Variable: Bid Price Plain-Labeled Food minus Bid Price GM-Labeled Food)
 Regression (1) Regression (2)
 Regressors Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
 Intercept 0.27*** 0.05 0.14 0.22
 GM Labels in Round 1 -0.17*** 0.05 -0.15*** 0.06
 Female -0.05 0.06
 Education 0.01 0.01
 Age -0.00 0.00
 Informed 0.06 0.06
 Vegetable Oil (fixed effect) 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07
 Tortilla Chips (fixed effect) 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07
 Log Likelihood -414.02 -412.45
 ♦♦♦Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
 methodological feature of our study. The coefficients of the two dummy variables for com-
 modity fixed effects, however, are not significantly different from zero.18 No commodity-
 specific fixed effects are observed in the results in table 4.19
 Discussion
 The results presented here go beyond earlier studies in three key areas. First, it was
 observed that 58% of the adult participants bid less for at least one of the three GM-
 labeled products, while 26% of the participants disliked GM foods intensely enough that
 they bid less for every GM-labeled product. Second, the method allows us to estimate the
 price discount U.S. consumers might register in grocery stores if GM foods were labeled.
 In our lab experiments, consumers discounted the GM-labeled food by an average of 14%
 relative to the standard-labeled food.
 The GM food industry seems likely to continue to oppose GM food labels, but the non-
 GM food industry may see new opportunities to supply non-GM foods at a premium.
 Although the results of this analysis differ from the experimental auction results re-
 ported by Lusk et al., they acknowledged the limitations placed on their results by using
 only undergraduate students: "If experiments were conducted with a larger, potentially
 more representative sample, we would expect a larger percentage of participants to bid
 [for non-GM food], and bid at higher levels" (Lusk et al., p. 55). Our results confirm the
 expectation expressed by Lusk et al. Specifically, the average adult in two major Mid-
 western cities discounted GM-labeled foods by about 14% relative to standard-labeled
 18 Our treatments include two labels and three information packets for a total of six labeling and information treatments.
 The econometric model for equation (3) was also refitted including dummy variables for information treatments, and results
 were not materially different from those reported in table 4. (See Rousu et al. for an analysis of the impacts of diffuse
 information on participants' willingness to pay.) Some of the information effects are statistically significant.
 19 Other censored regression models were fitted for equation (3), including regressors for a participant's pre-auction risk
 perceptions associated with irradiated foods, meat from animals fed growth hormones, and vaccines to prevent diseases. We
 also fitted models including a participant's household income, marital status, race, and other variables. None of these vari-
 ables had a coefficient that was statistically different from zero for explaining bid differences for the GM-labeled and plain-
 labeled food products.
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 foods, and almost 60% of our sample showed a dislike for genetic modification, as
 revealed by a lower bid for a GM-labeled food relative to the standard-labeled counter-
 part. Third, participants in our lab experiments placed about the same percentage
 discount for each of the three GM-labeled food products, suggesting consumers are less
 concerned about how genetic modification enters the food product than the fact it has
 entered the food product, and that their concerns are primarily environmental.
 Two interpretations are possible from our results. One interpretation is that without
 the GM labels, a respondent is bidding more for GM food than he/she otherwise would.
 Under this interpretation, GM food labels would therefore benefit consumers by inform-
 ing them of GM content, which would lower their bids. The alternative interpretation
 is that consumers do not understand genetic modification. Given that GM food products
 are deemed to be "substantially equivalent" to their non-GM counterparts, this interpre-
 tation implies consumers would be better off by not being exposed to GM labels. If this
 is the case, more information on the risks or benefits of GM foods could help consumers
 make better informed decisions. Whatever the interpretation, our results provide
 evidence that consumers' willingness to pay for GM-labeled foods is significantly lower
 than their willingness to pay for the plain-labeled counterpart.
 Conclusion
 This study has demonstrated that consumers' willingness to pay for a food product
 decreases when the food label indicates the food product is genetically modified. The
 evidence shows consumers were willing to pay a 14% premium for food items they per-
 ceived as not genetically modified. Sociodemographic attributes of the participants -
 gender, education, household income, and prior beliefs about GM - do not alter signifi-
 cantly a consumer's WTP for GM foods. Our results, however, provide evidence that the
 order in which consumers bid on foods (i.e., whether they bid on the food with GM labels
 in round 1 or round 2) affects WTP for GM foods. Participants who bid on food with GM
 labels in round 1 had a higher WTP for GM food than the participants who bid on food
 with GM food labels in round 2. Because sequencing matters, we emphasize that future
 economics experiments randomize all treatments.
 The implications of this study are notable given the ongoing global controversy over
 the issue of labels on GM foods. This debate has forced many countries around the world
 to consider or to implement new food-labeling policies. Given that the average adult
 consumer in a major Midwestern city revealed a significant premium for foods perceived
 as being non-GM, a mandatory GM labeling policy seems unlikely to be in the best inter-
 est of the biotechnology industry - but may be in the interest of consumers. From the
 perspective of the biotech industry, the use of GM labels would likely reduce consumers'
 willingness to pay for products which otherwise would be plain labeled.
 Future research might examine the robustness of these results by replicating experi-
 ments in other areas of the country. Another avenue for future research would be
 to examine consumers' reaction to GM foods having specific consumer benefits, e.g.,
 enhanced protein, vitamins, micro-nutrient content, shelf life. Two such products are
 Flavor-Saver tomatoes which were genetically engineered to have a longer shelf life, and
 "golden rice" which was genetically modified to provide more vitamin A, an attribute
 having potential benefits for people in third-world countries.
 [Received December 2002; final revision received September 2003.]
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 Appendix:
 Biotechnology Information Released
 to Participants During the Experiment
 A International Environmental Group Information
 The following is a collection of statements and information on genetic modification from Greenpeace, a
 leading environmental group.
 General Information
 Genetic modification is one of the most dangerous things being done to your food sources today. There
 are many reasons that genetically modified foods should be banned, mainly because unknown adverse
 effects could be catastrophic! Inadequate safety testing of GM plants, animals, and food products has
 occurred, so humans are the ones testing whether or not GM foods are safe. Consumers should not have
 to test new food products to ensure that they are safe.
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 Scientific Impact
 The process of genetic modification takes genes from one organism and puts them into another. This
 process is very risky. The biggest potential hazard of genetically modified (GM) foods is the unknown.
 This is a relatively new technique, and no one can guarantee that consumers will not be harmed.
 Recently, many governments in Europe assured consumers that there would be no harm to consumers
 over mad-cow disease, but unfortunately, their claims were wrong. We do not want consumers to be
 harmed by GM food.
 Human Impact
 Genetically modified foods could pose major health problems. The potential exists for allergens to be
 transferred to a GM food product that no one would suspect. For example, if genes from a peanut were
 transferred into a tomato, and someone who is allergic to peanuts eats this new tomato, they could
 display a peanut allergy. Another problem with genetically modified foods is a moral issue. These foods
 are taking genes from one living organism and transplanting them into another. Many people think it
 is morally wrong to mess around with life forms on such a fundamental level.
 Financial Impact
 GM foods are being pushed onto consumers by big businesses, which care only about their own profits
 and ignore possible negative side effects. These groups are actually patenting different life forms that
 they genetically modify, with plans to sell them in the future. Studies have also shown that GM crops
 may get lower yields than conventional crops.
 Environmental Impact
 Genetically modified foods could pose major environmental hazards. Sparse testing of GM plants for
 environmental impacts has occurred. One potential hazard could be the impact of GM crops on wildlife.
 One study showed that one type of GM plant killed Monarch butterflies. Another potential environ-
 mental hazard could come from pests that begin to resist GM plants that were engineered to reduce
 chemical pesticide application. The harmful insects and other pests that get exposed to these crops could
 quickly develop tolerance and wipe out many of the potential advantages of GM pest resistance.
 B. Biotech Industry Information
 The following is a collection of statements and information on genetic modification provided by a group
 of leading biotechnology companies, including Monsanto and Syngenta.
 General Information
 Genetically modified plants and animals have the potential to be one of the greatest discoveries in the
 history of farming. Improvements in crops so far relate to improved insect and disease resistance and
 weed control. These improvements using bioengineering/GM technology lead to reduced cost of food
 production. Future GM food products may have health benefits.
 Scientific Impact
 Genetic modification is a technique that has been used to produce food products that are approved by
 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Genetic engineering has brought new opportunities to
 farmers for pest control and in the future will provide consumers with nutrient enhanced foods. GM
 plants and animals have the potential to be the single greatest discovery in the history of agriculture.
 We have seen just the tip of the iceberg of future potential.
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 Human Impact
 The health benefits from genetic modification can be enormous. A special type of rice called "golden rice"
 has already been created which has higher levels of vitamin A. This could be very helpful because the
 disease Vitamin A Deficiency (VAD) is devastating in third-world countries. VAD causes irreversible
 blindness in over 500,000 children and is also responsible for over one million deaths annually. Since
 rice is the staple food in the diets of millions of people in the third world, golden rice has the potential
 of improving millions of lives a year by reducing the cases of VAD. The FDA has approved GM food for
 human consumption, and Americans have been consuming GM foods for years. While every food product
 may pose risks, there has never been a documented case of a person getting sick from GM food.
 Financial Impact
 Genetically modified plants have reduced the cost of food production, which means lower food prices,
 and that can help feed the world. In America, lower food prices help decrease the number of hungry
 people and also let consumers save a little more money on food. Worldwide the number of hungry people
 has been declining, but increased crop production using GM technology can also help further reduce
 world hunger.
 Environmental Impact
 GM technology has produced new methods of insect control that reduce chemical insecticide application
 by 50% or more. This means less environmental damage. GM weed control is providing new methods
 to control weeds, which are a special problem in no-till farming. Genetic modification of plants has the
 potential to be one of the most environmentally helpful discoveries ever.
 C. Independent, Third-Party Information
 The following is a statement on genetic modification approved by a third-party group consisting of a
 variety of individuals knowledgeable about genetically modified foods, including scientists, professionals,
 religious leaders, and academics. These parties have no financial stake in genetically modified foods.
 General Information
 Bioengineering is a type of genetic modification where genes are transferred across plants or animals,
 a process that would not otherwise occur. (In common usage, genetic modification means bioengineer-
 ing.) With bioengineered pest resistance in plants, the process is somewhat similar to the process of how
 a flu shot works in the human body. Flu shots work by injecting a virus into the body to help make a
 human body more resistant to the flu. Bioengineered plant-pest resistance causes a plant to enhance
 its own pest resistance.
 Scientific Impact
 The Food and Drug Administration standards for GM food products (chips, cereals, potatoes, etc.) are
 based on the principle that they have essentially the same ingredients, although they have been
 modified slightly from the original plant materials. Oils made from bioengineered oil crops have been
 refined, and this process removes essentially all the GM proteins, making them like non-GM oils. So
 even if GM crops were deemed to be harmful for human consumption, it is doubtful that vegetable oils
 would cause harm.
 Human Impact
 While many genetically modified foods are in the process of being put on your grocer's shelf, there are
 currently no foods available in the U.S. where genetic modification has increased nutrient content. All
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 foods present a small risk of an allergic reaction to some people. No FDA-approved GM food poses any
 known unique human health risks.
 Financial Impact
 Genetically modified seeds and other organisms are produced by businesses that seek profits. For
 farmers to switch to GM crops, they must see benefits from the switch. However, genetic modification
 technology may lead to changes in the organization of the agribusiness industry and farming. The
 introduction of GM foods has the potential to decrease the prices to consumers for groceries.
 Environmental Impact
 The effects of genetic modification on the environment are largely unknown. Bioengineered insect
 resistance has reduced farmers' applications of environmentally hazardous insecticides. More studies
 are occurring to help assess the impact of bioengineered plants and organisms on the environment. A
 couple of studies reported harm to Monarch butterflies from GM crops, but other scientists were not
 able to recreate the results. The possibility of insects growing resistant to GM crops is a legitimate
 concern.
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